Using Matching, Instrumental Variables and Control Functions to Estimate Economic Choice Models by James J. Heckman & Salvador Navarro-Lozano
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
USING MATCHING, INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES










This research was supported by NSF SES-0099195, NIH HD34958-04 and the American Bar Foundation.
Navarro-Lozano acknowledges financial support from CONACYT, Mexico. We thank Alberto Abadie, Pedro
Carneiro, Michael Lechner and Costas Meghir for helpful comments. The views expressed herein are those
of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
©2003 by James Heckman and Salvador Navarro-Lozano.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text not to
exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit including notice,
is given to the source.Using Matching, Instrumental Variables and Control Functions 
to Estimate Economic Choice Models
James Heckman and Salvador Navarro-Lozano  




This paper investigates four topics. (1) It examines the different roles played by the propensity score
(probability of selection) in matching, instrumental variable and control functions methods. (2) It
contrasts the roles of exclusion restrictions in matching and selection models. (3) It characterizes
the sensitivity of matching to the choice of conditioning variables and demonstrates the greater
robustness of control function methods to misspecification of the conditioning variables. (4) It
demonstrates the problem of choosing the conditioning variables in matching and the failure of
conventional model selection criteria when candidate conditioning variables are not exogenous.
James J. Heckman Salvador Navarro-Lozano
Department of Economics Department of Economics
The University of Chicago The University of Chicago
1126 East 59th Street 1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL 60637 Chicago, IL 60637
and NBER snavarro@uchicago.edu
jjh@uchicago.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The method of matching has become popular in evaluating social programs because it is easy to understand
and easy to apply. It uses observed explanatory variables to adjust for diﬀerences in outcomes unrelated
to treatment that give rise to selection bias. Propensity score matching as developed by Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983) is particularly simple to apply. The propensity score is the probability that an agent
takes treatment. If the analyst knows (without having to estimate) the probability that a person takes
treatment, and the assumptions of matching are ful￿lled, he can condition on that known probability and
avoid selection in means and marginal distributions. This choice probability also plays a central role in
econometric selection models based on the principle of control functions (Heckman, 1980; Heckman and
Robb, 1986, reprinted 2000; Heckman and Hotz, 1989; Ahn and Powell, 1993) and in instrumental variable
models (see e.g. Heckman and Vytlacil, 1999, 2001, 2003 or Heckman, 2001).
The multiple use of the propensity score in diﬀerent statistical methods has given rise to some confusion
in the applied literature.1 This paper seeks to clarify the diﬀerent assumptions that justify the propensity
score in selection, matching and instrumental variables methods. We develop the following topics:
1. We orient the discussion of the selection of alternative estimators around the economic theory of
choice. We compare the diﬀerent roles that the propensity score plays in three widely used econo-
metric methods, and the implicit economic assumptions that underlie applications of these methods.
2. Conventional matching methods do not distinguish between excluded and included variables.2 We
show that matching breaks down when there are variables that predict the choice of treatment
perfectly whereas control function methods take advantage of exclusion restrictions and use the
information available from perfect prediction to obtain identi￿cation. Matching assumes away the
p o s s i b i l i t yo fp e r f e c tp r e d i c t i o nw h i l es e l e c t i o nm o d e l sr e l yo nt h i sp r o p e r t yi nl i m i ts e t s .
3. We de￿ne the concepts of ￿relevant￿ information and ￿minimal relevant￿ information, and distinguish
agent and analyst information sets. We state clearly what information is required to identify diﬀerent
treatment parameters. In particular we show that when the analyst does not have access to the
￿minimal relevant￿ information, matching estimates of diﬀerent treatment parameters are biased.
Having more information, but not all of the ￿minimal relevant￿ information, can increase the bias
compared to having less information. Enlarging the analyst￿s information set with variables that do
not belong in the relevant information set may either increase or decrease the bias from matching.
Because the method of control functions explicitly models omitted relevant variables, rather than
3assuming that there are none, it is more robust to omitted conditioning variables.
4. The method of matching oﬀers no guidance as to which variables to include or exclude in conditioning
sets. Such choices can greatly aﬀect inference. There is no support for the commonly used rules
of selecting matching variables by choosing the set of variables that maximizes the probability of
successful prediction into treatment or by including variables in conditioning sets that are statistically
signi￿cant in choice equations. This weakness is shared by many econometric procedures but is not
fully appreciated in recent applications of matching which apply these selection rules when choosing
conditioning sets.
To simplify the exposition, throughout this paper we consider a one-treatment, two-outcome model.
Our main points apply more generally.
2 A Prototypical Model of Economic Choice
To focus the discussion, and interpret the implicit assumptions underlying the diﬀerent estimators presented
in this paper, we present a benchmark model of economic choice. For simplicity we consider two potential
outcomes (Y0,Y 1). D =1if Y1 is selected. D =0if Y0 is selected. Agents pick their outcome based on
utility maximization. Let V be utility. We write
V = µV (Z,UV ) D =1( V> 0), (1)
where the Z are factors (observed by the analyst) determining choices, UV are the unobserved (by the
analyst) factors determining choice and 1 is an indicator function (1(A)=1if A is true; 1(A)=0
otherwise). We consider diﬀerences between agent information sets and analyst information sets in Section
(6).
Potential outcomes are written in terms of observed variables (X) and unobserved (by the analyst)
outcome-speci￿cv a r i a b l e s
Y1 = µ1(X,U1) (2a)
Y0 = µ0(X,U0). (2b)
We assume throughout that U0,U 1,U V are (absolutely) continuous random variables and that all means
are ￿nite. The individual level treatment eﬀect is
∆ = Y1 − Y0.
4More familiar forms of (1), (2a) and (2b) are additively separable:
V = µV (Z)+UV E(UV )=0 (10)
Y1 = µ1(X)+U1 E(U1)=0 (2a0)
Y0 = µ0(X)+U0 E(U0)=0 . (2b0)
Additive separability is not strictly required in matching, or most versions of selection (control function)
models. However, we use the additively separable representation throughout most of this paper because
of its familiarity noting when it is a convenienc ea n dw h e ni ti sa ne s s e n t i a lp a r to fam e t h o d .
The distinction between X and Z is crucial to the validity of many econometric procedures. In matching
as conventionally formulated there is no distinction between X and Z.T h er o l e so fX and Z in alternative
estimators are explored in this paper.
3 Parameters of Interest in this Paper
There are many parameters of interest that can be derived from this model if U1 6= U0 and agents use
some or all of the U0,U 1 in making their decisions (see Heckman and Robb, 1985, 1986; Heckman, 1992;
Heckman, Smith and Clements, 1997 ; Heckman and Vytlacil, 2001 and Heckman, 2001). Here we focus
on certain means because they are traditional. As noted by Heckman and Vytlacil (2000) and Heckman
(2001), the traditional means do not answer many interesting economic questions.
The traditional means are:
ATE : E(Y1 − Y0|X) (Average Treatment Eﬀect)
TT : E(Y1 − Y0|X,D =1 )(Treatment on the Treated)
MTE : E(Y1 − Y0|X,Z,V =0 )(Marginal Treatment Eﬀect).
The MTE is the marginal treatment eﬀect introduced into the evaluation literature by Bj￿rklund and
Moﬃtt (1987). It is the average gain to persons who are indiﬀerent to participating in sector 1 or sector
0g i v e nX,Z. These are persons at the margin, de￿ned by X and Z. Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2000)
show how the MTE can be used to construct all mean treatment parameters, including the policy relevant
treatment parameters, under the conditions speci￿ed in their papers.
54 The Selection Problem
Let Y = DY1 +( 1− D)Y0. Samples generated by choices have the following means which are assumed to
be known:
E(Y |X,Z,D =1 )=E(Y1|X,Z,D =1 )
and
E(Y |X,Z,D =0 )=E(Y0|X,Z,D =0 )
for outcomes of Y1 for participants and the outcomes of Y0 for non-participants, respectively. In addition,
choices are observed so that in large samples Pr(D =1 |X,Z), i.e., the probability of choosing treatment
is known. From the means we can integrate out Z given X and D to construct
E(Y1|X,D =1 )and E(Y0|X,D =0 ) .
The biases from using the diﬀerence of these means to construct various counterfactuals are, for the
three parameters studied in this paper:
Bias TT =[ E(Y |X,D =1 )− E(Y |X,D =0 ) ]− [E(Y1 − Y0|X,D =1 ) ]
=[ E(Y0|X,D =1 )− E(Y0|X,D =0 ) ] .
In the case of additive separability
Bias TT = E[U0|X,D =1 ]− E[U0|X,D =0 ] .
For ATE,
Bias ATE = E[Y |X,D =1 ]− E(Y |X,D =0 )− [E(Y1 − Y0|X)].
In the case of additive separability
Bias ATE =[ E (U1|X,D =1 )− E (U1|X)] − [E(U0|X,D =0 )− E(U0|X)].
For MTE,
Bias MTE = E(Y |X,Z,D =1 )− E(Y |X,Z,D =0 )− E(Y1 − Y0|X,Z,V =0 )
=[ E(U1|X,Z,D =1 )− E(U1|X,Z,V =0 ) ]− [E(U0|X,Z,D =0 )− E(U0|X,Z,V =0 ) ]
in the case of additive separability. The MTE is de￿ned for a subset of persons indiﬀerent between the
two sectors and so is de￿ned for X and Z. The bias is the diﬀerence between average U1 for participants
and marginal U1 minus the diﬀerence between average U0 for nonparticipants and marginal U0.E a c ho f
these terms is a bias which can be called a selection bias.
65H o w D i ﬀerent Methods Solve the Bias Problem
In this section we consider the identi￿cation conditions that underlie matching, control functions and
instrumental variable methods to identify the three parameters using the data on mean outcomes. We
start with the method of matching.
5.1 Matching
The method of matching as conventionally formulated makes no distinction between X and Z. De￿ne the
conditioning set as W =( X,Z). The strong form of matching advocated by Rosenbaum and Rubin (and
numerous predecessor papers) assumes that
(Y1,Y0) ⊥ ⊥ D|W (M-1)
and
0 < Pr(D =1 |W)=P(W) < 1, (M-2)
where ￿⊥ ⊥￿ denotes independence given the conditioning variables after ￿|￿. Condition (M-2) implies that
the treatment parameters can be de￿ned for all values of W (i.e., for each W, in very large samples there
are observations for which we observe a Y0 and other observations for which we observe a Y1). Rosenbaum
and Rubin show that under (M-1) and (M-2)
(Y1,Y 0) ⊥ ⊥ D|P(W). (M-3)
This reduces the dimensionality of the matching problem. They assume that P is known.3 Under these
assumptions, conditioning on P eliminates all three biases de￿ned in section (4) because
E (Y1|D =0 ,P(W)) = E (Y1|D =1 ,P(W)) = E (Y1|P (W))
E (Y0|D =1 ,P(W)) = E (Y0|D =0 ,P(W)) = E (Y0|P (W)).
Thus for TT we can identify E (Y0|D =1 ,P(W)) from E (Y0|D =0 ,P(W)). In fact, we only need the
weaker condition Y0 ⊥ ⊥ D|P(W) to remove the bias4 because E (Y1|P (W),D=1 )is known, and only
E (Y0|P (W),D=1 ) is unknown. From the observed conditional means we can form ATE. Observe
that since ATE = TT for all X,Z under (M-1) and (M-2), the average person equals the marginal
person, conditional on W, and there is no bias in estimating MTE.5 The strong implicit assumption that
the marginal participant in a program gets the same return as the average participant in the program,
conditional on W, is an unattractive implication of these assumptions (see Heckman, 2001 and Heckman
7and Vytlacil, 2003). The method assumes that all of the dependence between UV and (U1,U 0) is eliminated
by conditioning on W:
UV ⊥ ⊥ (U1,U0)|W.
This motivates the term ￿selection on observables￿ introduced in Heckman and Robb (1985; 1986, reprinted
2000).
Assumption (M-2) has the unattractive feature that if the analyst has too much information about
the decision of who takes treatment so that P (W)=1or 0 the method breaks down because people
cannot be compared at a common W. The method of matching assumes that, given W, some unspeci￿ed
randomization device allocates people to treatment.
Introducing the distinction between X and Z allows the analyst to overcome the problem of perfect
prediction if there are some variables Z not in X so that, for certain values of these variables, and for each
X either P (X,Z)=1or P (X,Z)=0 .I fP is a nontrivial function of Z (so P (X,Z) varies with Z for all
X)a n dX can be varied independently of Z,6 and outcomes are de￿n e ds o l e l yi nt e r m so fX,t h i sd i ﬃculty
with matching disappears and treatment parameters can be de￿ned for all values of X in its support (see
Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997).
Oﬀsetting the disadvantages of matching, the method of matching with a known conditioning set that
produces (M-1) does not require separability of outcome or choice equations, exogeneity of conditioning
variables, exclusion restrictions or adoption of speci￿c functional forms of outcome equations. Such fea-
tures are common in conventional selection (control function) methods and conventional IV formulations
although recent work in semiparametric estimation relaxes many of these assumptions, as we note below.
Moreover, the method does not strictly require (M-1). One can get by with weaker mean independence
assumptions:
E (Y1|W,D =1 ) = E (Y1|W) (M-10)
E (Y0|W,D =0 ) = E (Y0|W),
in the place of the stronger (M-1) conditions. However, if (M-10) is involved, the assumption that we can
replace W by P (W) does not follow from the analysis of Rosenbaum and Rubin, and is an additional new
assumption.
In the recent literature, the claim is sometimes made that matching is ￿for free￿ (see, e.g., Gill
and Robins, 2001). The idea is that since E (Y0|D =1 ,W) is not observed, we might as well set it to
8E (Y0|D =0 ,W), an implication of (M-1). This argument is correct so far as data description goes. Match-
ing imposes just-identifying restrictions and in this sense ￿at a purely empirical level￿ is as good as any
other just-identifying assumption in describing the data.
However, the implied economic restrictions are not ￿for free￿. Imposing that, conditional on X and
Z, the marginal person is the same as the average person is a strong and restrictive feature of these
assumptions and is not a ￿for free￿ assumption in terms of economic content.7
5.2 Control Functions
The principle motivating the method of control functions is diﬀerent. (See Heckman, 1980 and Heckman
and Robb, 1985, 1986, reprinted 2000, where this principle was developed). Like matching, it works
with conditional expectations of (Y1,Y 0) given (X,Z and D). Conventional applications of the control
function method assume additive separability which is not required in matching. Strictly speaking, additive
separability is not required in the application of control functions either.8 What is required is a model
relating the outcome unobservables to the observables, including the choice of treatment. The method of
matching assumes that, conditional on the observables (X,Z), the unobservables are independent of D.9
For the additively separable case, control functions are based on the principle of modeling the conditional
expectations given X,Z and D :
E (Y1|X,Z,D =1 ) = µ1 (X)+E(U1|X,Z,D =1 )
E (Y0|X,Z,D =0 ) = µ0 (X)+E(U0|X,Z,D =0 ) .
The idea underlying the method of control functions is to explicitly model the stochastic dependence of
the unobservables in the outcome equations on the observables. This is unnecessary under the assumptions
of matching because conditional on (X,Z) there is no dependence between (U1,U 0) and D. Thus, if one can
model E (U1|X,Z,D =1 )and E (U0|X,Z,D =0 )and these functions can be independently varied against
µ1 (X) and µ0 (X) respectively, one can identify µ1 (X) and µ0 (X) up to constant terms.10 Nothing in
the method intrinsically requires that X,Z, or D be stochastically independent of U1 or U0, although
conventional methods often assume that (U1,U 0,U V ) ⊥ ⊥ (X,Z).
If we assume that U1,U V ⊥ ⊥ (X,Z) and adopt (10) as the choice model,
E (U1|X,Z,D =1 )=E (U1|UV ≥− µV (Z)) = K1 (P (X,Z)),
so the control function only depends on P (X,Z). By similar reasoning, if U0,U V ⊥ ⊥ (X,Z),
E (U0|X,Z,D =0 )=E (U0|UV < −µV (Z)) = K0 (P (X,Z))
9and the control function only depends on the propensity score. The key assumption needed to represent
the control function solely as a function of P (X,Z) is thus
(U1,U 0,U V ) ⊥ ⊥ (X,Z).
Under these conditions
E (Y1|X,Z,D =1 ) = µ1 (X)+K1 (P (X,Z))





K0 (P)=0where it is assumed that Z can be independently varied for all
X, and the limits are obtained by changing Z while holding X ￿xed.11 These limit results just say that
when the probability of being in a sample in one there is no selection bias.
If K1 (P (X,Z)) can be independently varied from µ1 (X) and K0 (P (X,Z)) can be independently





P (X,Z)=1 , then we can identify the constants, since in those limit
sets we identify µ1 (X) and µ0 (X).12 Under these conditions, it is possible to nonparametrically identify
all three treatment parameters:
ATE = µ1 (X) − µ0 (X)
TT = µ1 (X) − µ0 (X)+E (U1 − U0|X,Z,D =1 )






MTE = µ1 (X) − µ0 (X)+
∂ [E (U1 − U0|X,Z,D =1 )P (X,Z)]
∂ (P (X,Z))










Unlike the method of matching, the method of control functions allows the marginal treatment eﬀect
to be diﬀerent from the average treatment eﬀect or from treatment on the treated. Although conventional
practice is to derive the functional forms of K0 (P), K1 (P) by making distributional assumptions (e.g.,
normality, see Heckman, Tobias and Vytlacil (2001)), this is not an intrinsic feature of the method and
there are many non normal and semiparametric versions of this method (see Heckman and Vytlacil, 2003
for a survey).
In its semiparametric implementation, the method of control functions requires an exclusion restriction
(a Z not in X) to achieve nonparametric identi￿cation.14 The method of matching does not. The method of
10control functions requires that P (X,Z)=1and P (X,Z)=0to achieve full nonparametric identi￿cation.
The conventional method of matching excludes this case. Both methods require that treatment parameters
c a no n l yb ed e ￿ned on a common support:
support(X|D =1 )∩ support(X|D =0 )
A similar requirement is imposed on the generalization of matching with exclusion restrictions introduced
in Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997). Exclusion, both in matching and selection models, makes it more
likely to satisfy this condition.
In the method of control functions, P (X,Z) is a conditioning variable used to predict U1 conditional
on D and U0 conditional on D. In the method of matching, it is used to generate stochastic independence
between (U0,U 1) and D. In the method of control functions, as conventionally applied, (U0,U 1) ⊥ ⊥ (X,Z),
but this is not intrinsic to the method.15 This assumption plays no role in matching if the correct condition-
ing set is known (i.e., one that satis￿es (M-1) and (M-2)). However, as noted in section (6.6), exogeneity
plays a key role in the selection of conditioning variables. The method of control functions does not require
that (U0,U 1) ⊥ ⊥ D|(X,Z), which is a central requirement of matching. Equivalently, the method of control
f u n c t i o n sd o e sn o tr e q u i r e
(U0,U 1) ⊥ ⊥ UV |(X,Z)
whereas matching does. Thus matching assumes access to a richer set of conditioning variables than is
assumed in the method of control functions.
The method of control functions is more robust than the method of matching, in the sense that it
allows for outcome unobservables to be dependent on D even conditioning on (X,Z), and it models this
dependence, whereas the method of matching assumes no such dependence. Matching is thus a special
case of the method of control functions in which under assumptions (M-1) and (M-2),
E (U1|X,Z,D =1 ) = E (U1|X,Z)=E (U1|P (W))
E (U0|X,Z,D =0 ) = E (U0|X,Z)=E (U0|P (W)).
In the method of control functions in the case when (X,Z) ⊥ ⊥ (U0,U 1,U V )
E (Y |X,Z,D)=E (Y1|X,Z,D =1 )D + E (Y0|X,Z,D =0 )( 1− D)
= µ0 (X)+( µ1 (X) − µ0 (X))D + E (U1|X,Z,D =1 )D + E (U0|P (X,Z),D=0 )( 1− D)
= µ0 (X)+( µ1 (X) − µ0 (X))D + E (U1|P (X,Z),D=1 )D + E (U0|P (X,Z),D=0 )( 1− D)
= µ0 (X)+[ µ1 (X) − µ0 (X)+K1 (P (X,Z)) − K0 (P (X,Z))]D + K0 (P (X,Z)).
11Under assumptions (M-1) and (M-2) of the method of matching, we may write
E (Y |P (W),D)=µ0 (P (W))+[(µ1 (P (W)) − µ0 (P (W))) + E (U1|P (W)) − E (U0|P (W))]D+{E (U0|P (W))}.
Notice that
E (Y |P (W),D)=µ0 (P (W)) + [µ1 (P (W)) − µ0 (P (W))]D,
since E (U1|P (W)) = E (U0|P (W)) = 0.
The treatment eﬀect is identi￿ed from the coeﬃcient on D. Condition (M-2) guarantees that D is not
perfectly predictable by W so the variation in D identi￿es this parameter. Since µ1 (P (W))−µ0 (P (W)) =
ATE and ATE = TT = MTE, the method of matching identi￿es all of the mean treatment parameters.
Under the assumptions of matching, when means of Y1 and Y0 are the parameters of interest, the bias
terms vanish. They do not in the more general case considered by the method of control functions. This
is the mathematical counterpart of the randomization implicit in matching: conditional on W or P (W),
(U1,U 0) are random with respect to D. The method of control functions allows them to be nonrandom
with respect to D. In the absence of functional form assumptions, it requires an exclusion restriction to
separate out K0 (P (X,Z)) from the coeﬃcient on D. Matching produces identi￿cation without exclusion
restrictions whereas identi￿cation with exclusion restrictions is a central feature of the control function
method in the absence of functional form assumptions.
The fact that the control function approach is more general than the matching approach is implicitly
recognized in the work of Rosenbaum (1995) and Robins (1997). Their sensitivity analyses for matching
when there are unobserved conditioning variables are, in their essence, sensitivity analyses using control
functions.16
Tables 1 and 2 perform sensitivity analysis under diﬀerent assumptions about the parameters of the
underlying selection model. In particular, we assume that the data are generated by the model of equations
(10), (2a0)a n d( 2b0)a n dt h a t
(U1,U 0,U V )
0 ∼ N (0,Σ)
corr(Uj,U V )=ρjV
var(Uj)=σ2
j; j = {0,1}.
Using the formulae derived in the Appendix, we can write the biases of section (4) as
Bias TT(P (Z)=p)=σ0ρ0V M(p)
Bias ATE (P (Z)=p)=M(p)[σ1ρ1V (1 − p)+σ0ρ0V p]
12where M(p)=
φ(Φ−1(1−p))
p(1−p) , φ(•) and Φ(•) are the pdf and cdf of a standard normal random variable and
p is the propensity score. We assume that µ1 = µ0 so that the true average treatment eﬀect is zero.
We simulate the bias for diﬀerent values of the ρjV and σj. The results in the tables show that, as we let
the variances of the outcome equations grow, the value of the bias that we obtain can become substantial.
With large variances there are large biases. With larger correlations come larger biases. These tables
demonstrate the greater generality of the control function approach given the assumption of separability




is small, so that one might think that selection on unobservables is relatively unimportant, we still get
s u b s t a n t i a lb i a s e si fw ed on o tc o n t r o lf o rr e l e v a n to m itted conditioning variables. Only for special values
of the parameters do we avoid the bias by matching. These examples also demonstrate that sensitivity
analyses can be conducted for control function models even when they are not fully identi￿ed.
5.3 Instrumental Variables
Both the method of matching and the method of control functions work with E (Y |X,Z,D) and Pr(D =1 |X,Z).
The method of instrumental variables works with E (Y |X,Z) and Pr(D =1 |X,Z). There are two versions
of the method of instrumental variables: (a) conventional linear instrumental variables and (b) local instru-
mental variables (LIV ) (Heckman and Vytlacil, 1999, 2000, 2003; Heckman, 2001). LIV is equivalent to
a semiparametric selection model (See Vytlacil, 2002). It is an alternative way to implement the principle
of control functions. LATE (Imbens and Angrist, 1994) is a special case of LIV under the conditions we
specify below.
We ￿rst consider the conventional method of instrumental variables. In this framework, P (X,Z) arises
less naturally than it does in the matching and control function approaches. Z is the instrument and
P (X,Z) is a function of the instrument.
Rewrite the model of equations (2a0)a n d( 2b0)a s
Y = DY1 +( 1− D)Y0
= µ0 (X)+( µ1 (X) − µ0 (X)+U1 − U0)D + U0
= µ0 (X)+∆(X)D + U0
where ∆(X)=µ1 (X) − µ0 (X)+U1 − U0.W h e n U1 = U0, this is a conventional IV model with D
correlated with U0. Standard instrumental variables conditions apply and P (X,Z) is a valid instrument
if:
E (U0|P (X,Z),X)=E (U0|X) (IV-1)
13and
Pr(D =1 |X,Z) is a nontrivial function of Z for each X. (IV-2)
When U1 6= U0 but D ⊥ ⊥ (U1 − U0)|X (or alternatively UV ⊥ ⊥ (U1 − U0)|X) then the same two conditions
identify
ATE = E (Y1 − Y0|X)=E (∆(X)|X)
TT = E (Y1 − Y0|X,D =1 )=E (Y1 − Y0|X)
= MTE
and marginal equals average conditional on X and Z. The requirement that D ⊥ ⊥ (U1 − U0)|X is strong and
assumes that agents do not participate in the program on the basis of any information about unobservables
in gross gains (Heckman and Robb, 1985, 1986; Heckman, 1997).
The analytically more interesting case arises when U1 6= U0 and D 6⊥ ⊥ (U1 − U0). To identify ATE,w e
require
E (U0 + D(U1 − U0)|P (X,Z),X)=E (U0 + D(U1 − U0)|X) (IV-3)
and condition (IV-2) (Heckman and Robb, 1985, 1986; Heckman, 1997). To identify TT,w er e q u i r e
E (U0 + D(U1 − U0) − E (U0 + D(U1 − U0)|X)|P (X,Z),X)
= E (U0 + D(U1 − U0) − E (U0 + D(U1 − U0)|X)|X)
and condition (IV-2). No simple conditions exist to identify the MTE using linear instrumental variables
methods in the general case where D 6⊥ ⊥ (U1 − U0)|X,Z (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2000, 2003 characterize
what conventional IV estimates in terms of a weighted average of MTEs).
The conditions required to identify ATE using P as an instrument, may be written in the following
alternative form:
E (U0|P (X,Z),X)+E (U1 − U0|D =1 ,P(X,Z),X)P (X,Z)
= E (U0|X)+E (U1 − U0|D =1 ,X)P (X,Z)
If U1 = U0 (everyone with the same X responds to treatment in the same way) or (U1 − U0) ⊥ ⊥ D|P (X,Z),X
(people do not participate in treatment on the basis of unobserved gains), then these conditions are satis￿ed.
In general, the conditions are not satis￿ed by economic choice models, except under special cancellations
that are not generic. If Z is a determinant of choices, and U1 − U0 is in the agent￿s choice set (or is
correlated only partly with information in the agent￿s choice set), then this condition is not likely to be
satis￿ed.
14These identi￿cation conditions are fundamentally diﬀerent from the matching and control function
identi￿cation conditions. In matching, the essential condition for means is
E (U0|X,D =0 ,P(X,Z)) = E (U0|X,P (X,Z)) and
E (U1|X,D =1 ,P(X,Z)) = E (U1|X,P (X,Z))
These require that, conditional on P (X,Z) and X,U1 and U0 are mean independent of UV (or D). When
µ1 (W) and µ0 (W) are the conditional means of Y1 and Y0 respectively, these terms are zero.
The method of control functions models and estimates this dependence rather than assuming it vanishes.
The method of linear instrumental variables requires that the composite error term U0 + D(U1 − U0) be
mean independent of Z (or P (X,Z)), given X. Essentially, the conditions require that the dependence
of U0 and D(U1 − U0) on Z vanish through conditioning on X. Matching requires that U1 and U0 are
independent of D given (X,Z). These conditions are logically distinct. One set of conditions does not
imply the other set. Conventional IV in the general case does not answer a well posed economic question
(see Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil, 2001).
Local instrumental variables methods developed by Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2000, 2003) estimate
all three treatment parameters in the general case where (U1 − U0) 6⊥ ⊥ D|(X,Z) under the following
additional conditions
µD (Z) is a non-degenerate random variable given X (LIV-1)
(existence of an exclusion restriction)
(U0,U 1,U V ) ⊥ ⊥ Z|X (LIV-2)
0 < Pr(D|X) < 1 (LIV-3)
Support P (D|(X,Z)) = [0,1] (LIV-4)
Under these conditions
∂E(Y |X,P(Z))
∂(P(Z)) = MTE(X,P (Z),V =0 ).
17
Only (LIV-1) - (LIV-3) are required to identify this parameter.
As demonstrated by Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2000, 2003) and Heckman (2001), over the support
of (X,Z), MTE can be used to construct (under LIV-4) or bound (in the case of partial support) ATE
and TT. Policy relevant treatment eﬀects can be de￿ned, LATE is a special case of this method. Table
153 summarizes the alternative assumptions used in matching, control functions and instrumental variables
to identify treatment parameters. For the rest of the paper, we discuss matching, the topic of this special
issue. We ￿rst turn to consider the informational requirements of matching.
6 The Informational Requirements of Matching and the Bias When
They are not Satis￿ed
This section considers the informational requirements for matching.18 We introduce ￿ve distinct infor-
mation sets and establish relationships among them: (1) An information set that satis￿es conditional
independence (M-1), σ(IR∗), a ￿relevant￿ information set; (2) the minimal information set needed to sat-
isfy conditional independence (M-1), σ(IR), the ￿minimal relevant￿ information set; (3) the information
set available to the agent at the time decisions to participate are made, σ(IA);(4) the information avail-
able to the economist σ(IE∗) and (5) the information used by the economist (σ(IE)). We will de￿ne the
random variables generated by these sets as IR∗,I R,I A,I E∗,I E respectively.19
After de￿ning these information sets, we show the biases that result when econometricians use infor-
mation other than the relevant information set. More information does not necessarily reduce the bias in
matching. Standard algorithms for selecting conditioning variables are not guaranteed to pick the relevant
conditioning variables or reduce bias compared to conditioning sets not selected by these algorithms.
First we de￿ne the information sets more precisely.
De￿nition 1 We say that σ(IR∗) is a relevant information set if its associated random variable, IR∗,
satis￿es (M-1) so
(Y1,Y 0) ⊥ ⊥ D|IR∗
De￿nition 2 We say that σ(IR) is a minimal relevant information set if it is the intersection of all
sets σ(IR∗). The associated random variable IR is the minimum amount of information that guarantees
that (M-1) is satis￿ed.
If we de￿ne the minimal relevant information set as one that satis￿es conditional independence, it might
not be unique. If the set σ(IR1) satis￿es the conditional independence condition, then the set σ(IR1,Q)
such that Q ⊥ ⊥ (Y1,Y 0) | IR1 would also guarantee conditional independence. For this reason, we de￿ne
the relevant information set to be the minimal; i.e., to be the intersection of all such sets.
De￿nition 3 The agent￿s information set, σ(IA),i sd e ￿ned by the information IA used by the agent when
choosing among treatments. Accordingly, we call IA the agent￿s information.
16De￿nition 4 The econometrician￿s full information set, σ(IE∗),i sd e ￿ned as all of the information
available to the econometrician, IE∗.
De￿nition 5 The econometrician￿s information set, σ(IE), is de￿ned by the information used by the
econometrician when analyzing the agent￿s choice of treatment, IE.
Only three restrictions are imposed on the structure of these sets: σ(IR) ⊆ σ(IR∗),σ(IR) ⊆ σ(IA) and
σ(IE) ⊆ σ(IE∗).20 The ￿rst we have already discussed. The second one requires that the minimal relevant
information set must be part of the information the agent uses when deciding whether to take treatment.
The third requires that the information used by the econometrician must be part of the information he
observes. Other than these obvious orderings, the econometrician￿s information set may be diﬀerent from
the agent￿s or the relevant information set. The econometrician may know something the agent doesn￿t
know since typically he is observing events after the decision is made. At the same time, there may be
private information known to the agent. The matching assumptions (M-1) or (M-3) imply that
σ(IR) ⊆ σ(IE)
so that the econometrician uses the minimal relevant information set.
In order to have a concrete example of these information sets and their associated random variables,
we assume that the economic model generating the data is a generalized Roy model of the form
V = Zγ + UV where
UV = αV 1f1 + αV 2f2 + εV
D =1 if V ≥ 0, =0otherwise
and
Y1 = µ1 + U1 where U1 = α11f1 + α12f2 + ε1,
Y0 = µ0 + U0 where U0 = α01f1 + α02f2 + ε0,
where (f1,f 2,ε V ,ε 1,ε 0) are assumed to be mean zero random variables that are mutually independent of
each other and Z so that all the correlation among the elements of (U0,U 1,U V ) is captured by f =( f1,f 2).21
We keep implicit any dependence on X which may be general. The minimal relevant information for this
model when the factor loadings are not zero (αij 6=0 )is
IR = {f1,f 2}.
17The agent￿s information set may include diﬀerent variables. If we assume that ε0,ε 1 are shocks to
outcomes not known to the agent at the time decisions are made, the agent￿s information is
IA = {f1,f 2,Z,ε V }.
Under perfect certainty on the part of the agent
IA = {f1,f 2,Z,ε V ,ε 1,ε 0}.
In either case, all of the information available to the agent is not required to obtain conditional independence
(M-1). All three information sets guarantee conditional independence, but only the ￿rst is minimal relevant.
The observing economist may know some variables not in IA,I R∗ or IR but may not know all of the
variables in IR. In the following subsections, we address the question of what happens when the matching
assumption that σ(IE) ⊇ σ(IR) does not hold. That is, we analyze what happens to the matching bias as
the amount of information used by the econometrician is changed. In order to get closed form expressions
for the biases of the treatment parameters we add the additional assumption that
(f1,f 2,ε V ,ε 1,ε 0) ∼ N (0,Σ),









in the diagonal and zero in all the non-diagonal elements.
This assumption links matching models to conventional normal selection models. We next analyze various
cases.
6.1 The economist uses the minimal relevant information: σ(IR) ⊆ σ(IE)
We begin by analyzing the case in which the information used by the analyst is IE = {Z,f1,f 2}, so that
the econometrician has access to the relevant information set and it is larger than the minimal relevant
information set. In this case it is straightforward to show that matching identi￿es all of the mean treatment
parameters with no bias. The matching estimator is
E (Y1|D =1 ,I E) − E (Y0|D =0 ,I E)=µ1 − µ0 +( α11 − α01)f1 +( α12 − α02)f2
and all of the treatment parameters collapse to this same expression since, conditional on knowing f there
is no selection because (ε1,ε 0) ⊥ ⊥ UV . Recall that IR = {f1,f 2} and the economist needs less information
to achieve (M-1).
The analysis of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) tells us that knowledge of (Z,f1,f 2) and knowledge of
P (Z,f1,f 2) are equivalent so that matching on the propensity score also identi￿es all of the treatment



















can be written as εV
σεV
S Φ−1 (1 − p),w h e r eΦ is the cdf of a standard
normal random variable and φ is its density and f =( f1,f 2). The population matching condition is
E (Y1|D =1 ,P(IE)=p) − E (Y0|D =0 ,P(IE)=p)
= µ1 − µ0 + E (U1|D =1 ,P(IE)=p) − E (U0|D =0 ,P(IE)=p)
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As a consequence of the assumptions about mutual independence of the errors
Cov(Ui,ε V )=Cov(αi1f1 + αi2f2 + εi,ε V )=0 ,i =0 ,1.
In the context of this model, the case considered in this subsection is the one matching is designed to
solve. Even though a selection model generates the data, the fact that the information used by the econo-
metrician includes the minimal relevant information makes matching equivalent to the selection model.
We can estimate the treatment parameters with no bias since, as a consequence of the assumptions made
(U1,U 0) ⊥ ⊥ D|(f,Z), which is exactly what matching requires. The minimal relevant information set is
even smaller. We only need to know (f1,f 2) to secure this result, and we can de￿ne the propensity score
solely in terms of f1 and f2, and the Rosenbaum-Rubin result still goes through.
196.2 The Economist does not Use All of the Minimal Relevant Information
Now, suppose that the information used by the econometrician is
IE = {Z}
but there is selection on the unobservable (to the analyst) f1,f 2, i.e., the factor loadings αij are all non












S Φ−1 (1 − p).
Using the analysis presented in the Appendix, the bias for the diﬀerent treatment parameters is given by
Bias TT(P (Z)=p)=β0M(p), (3)
where M(p)=M1(p) − M0(p).
































It is not surprising that matching on variables that exclude the relevant conditioning variables produces
bias. The advantage of working with a closed form expression for the bias is that it allows us to answer
questions about the magnitude of this bias under diﬀerent assumptions about the information available to
the analyst, and to present some simple examples. We next use expressions (3), (4) and (5) as benchmarks
against which to compare the relative size of the bias when we enlarge the econometrician￿s information
set beyond Z.
6.3 Adding information to the Econometrician￿s Information Set IE: Using Some but
not All the Information from the Minimal Relevant Information Set IR
Suppose next that the econometrician uses more information but not all of the information in the minimal
relevant information set. Possibly, the data set assumed in the preceding section is augmented or else the
20econometrician decides to use information previously available. In particular, assume that
I0
E = {Z,f2}.
Under conditions 1, 2 and 3 presented below the biases for the treatment parameters of section (6.2) are



















Then, we just compare the biases under the two cases using formulae (3) - (5) suitably modi￿ed but keeping
p ￿xed.
Condition 1 The bias produced by using matching to estimate TT is smaller in absolute value for any
given p when the new information set σ(I0





Condition 2 The bias produced by using matching to estimate ATE is smaller in absolute value for any
given p when the new information set σ(I0
E) is used if
|β1 (1 − p)+β0p| >
ﬂ ﬂβ0
1 (1 − p)+β0
0p
ﬂ ﬂ.
Condition 3 The bias produced by using matching to estimate MTE is smaller in absolute value for any
given p when the new information set σ(I0
E) is used if
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Proof. These are straightforward applications of formulae (3)-(5), modi￿ed to account for the diﬀerent






It is important to notice that we condition on the same p in deriving these expressions.
These conditions do not always hold. In general, whether or not the bias will be reduced by adding
additional conditioning variables depends on the relative importance of the additional information in both
the outcome equations and on the signs of the terms inside the absolute value.



































=0 , clearly β0 <β 0






















As α02 increases, there is some critical value α∗
02 beyond which β0 >β 0
0.
If we assumed that β0 < 0 however, the exact opposite conclusion would hold and the conditions would
be harder to meet as the relative importance of the new information is increased. Similar expressions can
be derived for ATE and MTE in which the direction of the eﬀect depends on the signs of the terms in the
absolute value.
Figures 1, 2 and 3 illustrate the point that adding some but not all information from the minimal
relevant set might increase the bias for all treatment parameters. In these ￿gures we let the variances of
the factors and the error terms be equal to one and set
α01 = αV 1 = αV 2 =1
α02 = α12 =0 .1
α11 =2
so that we have a case in which the information being added is relatively unimportant in terms of outcomes.
The fact that the bias might increase when adding some but not all information from IR is a feature
that is not shared by the method of control functions. Since the method of control functions models the
stochastic dependence of the unobservables in the outcome equations on the observables, changing the
variables observed by the econometrician to include f2 does not generate bias, it only changes the control










22but do not generate any bias. This is a major advantage of this method. It controls for the bias of the
omitted conditioning variables by modelling it. Of course, if the model for the bias is not valid, neither is
the correction for the bias. Matching evades this problem by assuming that the analyst always knows the
correct conditioning variables and they satisfy (M-1).
6.4 Adding information to the econometrician￿s information set: using proxies for the
relevant information
Suppose that instead of knowing some part of the minimal relevant information set, such as f2, the analyst
has access to a proxy for it.22 In particular, assume that he has access to a variable e Z that is correlated







a n ds u p p o s et h a th eu s e si ts oe IE = e IE∗. In order to obtain closed form expressions for the biases we
further assume that









= ρ, and e Z ⊥ ⊥ (ε0,ε 1,ε V ,f 1).
We de￿ne expressions comparable to β and β0 :
e β1 =
α11αV 1σ2


























E for e IE and β0
j for e βj (j =0 ,1) into Conditions (1), (2) and (3) of section (6.3) we
obtain equivalent results for this case. Whether e IE will be bias reducing depends on how well it spans IR
and on the signs of the terms in the absolute values.
In this case, however, there is another parameter to consider: the correlation between e Z and f2.I f
|ρ| =1we are back to the case of e IE = I0
E because e Z is a perfect proxy for f2.I fρ =0we are essentially
back to the case analyzed in section (6.3). Since we know that the bias might either increase or decrease
when f2 is used as a conditioning variable but f1 is not, we know that it is not possible to determine
whether the bias increases or decreases as we change the correlation between f2 and e Z.T h a ti s ,w ek n o w
23that going from ρ =0to |ρ| =1might change the bias in any direction. Use of a better proxy in this
correlational sense may produce a more biased estimate.
>From the analysis of section (6.3), it is straightforward to derive conditions under which the bias
generated when the econometrician￿s information is e IE is smaller than when it is I0
E.T h a ti s ,i tc a nb e
the case that knowing the proxy variable e Z is better than knowing the actual variable f2.T a k ea g a i nt h e
treatment on the treated case as a simple example (i.e., Condition (1)). The bias is reduced when e Z is
used instead of f2 if
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
α01αV 1σ2
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Figures 4, 5 and 6 use the same example of the previous section to illustrate the two points being made
here. Namely, that using a proxy for an unobserved relevant variable might increase the bias.O n t h e
other hand, it might be better in terms of bias to use a proxy than to use the actual variable, f2.
6.5 The case of a discrete treatment
T h ep o i n t st h a tw eh a v em a d es of a rd on o ts t r i c t l yd e p e n do na l lo ft h ea s s u m p t i o n sw eh a v em a d e
to produce simple examples. In particular, we require neither normality nor additive separability of the
outcomes. The proposition that if the econometrician￿s information set includes all the minimal relevant
information, matching identi￿es the correct treatment, is true more generally provided that any additional
extraneous information used is ￿exogenous￿ in a sense to be precisely de￿ned in the next section. In this
subsection, we present a simple analysis of a discrete treatment that does not rely on either normality or
separability of outcome equations.23
Suppose that outcomes (Yj) are binary random variables generated by the following model:
Y ∗
j = µj + Uj (6)
Uj = αj1f1 + αj2f2 + εj , j =0 ,1
Yj =1 if Y ∗
j ≥ 0, =0otherwise,
where j =1corresponds to treatment and j =0corresponds to no treatment. People receive treatment
according to the rule
V = µV + UV (7)
UV = αV1f1 + αV2f2 + εV
D =1 if V ≥ 0, =0otherwise;
24a n dw ea s s u m et h a t
f1 ⊥ ⊥ f2 ⊥ ⊥ ε0 ⊥ ⊥ ε1 ⊥ ⊥ εV .
Each of these error components has a zero mean, the observed outcome is either zero or one and is given
by
Y = DY1 +( 1− D)Y0.
An example of such a model arises when we observe whether a person is working or not and when the
probability of being employed might be diﬀerent if the person has participated in a training program.
There are many ways in which the eﬀect of treatment can be de￿ned in this model. (see Aakvik,
Heckman and Vytlacil, 2003) One way is given by the ratio of the probabilities of observing Y1 =1given
that the person receives treatment and the counterfactual probability of observing Y0 =1given that the
person chooses treatment but does not receive it. That is, the eﬀect of treatment is given by:
∆1 (IE)=
Pr(Y1 =1 ,D=1 |IE)
Pr(Y0 =1 ,D=1 |IE)
.







One could also work with logs:
∆3 (IE)=l o g ( ∆1)
∆4 (IE)=l o g ( ∆2).
Under the null hypothesis of no eﬀect of treatment ∆1 = ∆2 =1 . More generally these ratios can be either
smaller or greater than one depending on whether there is a positive or negative eﬀect of treatment. In
order to ￿x ideas, we will call ∆1 the eﬀect of treatment under the understanding that equivalent results
can be obtained for other de￿nitions.
The econometrician measures the eﬀect of treatment by ￿matching￿ the observed distributions according
to some variables that he observes. Since Y0 is only observed when D =0the analyst attempts to identify
the eﬀect of treatment by
b ∆1 (IE)=
Pr(Y1 =1 ,D=1 |IE)
Pr(Y0 =1 ,D=0 |IE)
.
The denominator replaces the desired probability Pr(Y0 =1 ,D=1 |IE) b yt h ea v a i l a b l ei n f o r m a t i o nPr(Y0 =1 ,D=0 |
Let there be no real eﬀect of treatment so that, in terms of the model given by equations (6) and (7) we
25have that ∆1 =1and ∆2 =1so
µ1 = µ0 = µ
FU1 = FU0 = FU
which can be generated by setting
α11 = α01 = α1
α12 = α02 = α2
Fε1 = Fε0 = Fε
where FX denotes the cdf of X.
We initially assume that the analyst has access to the minimal relevant information set and uses it.
That is, we assume that
IE = {f1,f 2}.
In this case, in large samples the estimated eﬀect of treatment is
b ∆1 (IE)=
Pr(Y1 =1 ,D=1 |f1,f 2)
Pr(Y0 =1 ,D=0 |f1,f 2)
=
Pr(Y1 =1 |f1,f 2)
Pr(Y0 =1 |f1,f 2)
= ∆1(IE).
Under the null of no treatment eﬀect, ∆1 = ∆2 =1 . Conditioning on (f1,f 2) removes any dependence
on D, and we can replace the denominator of ∆1 by Pr(Y0 =1 ,D=0 |f1,f 2). If we do not condition on
information that contains the minimal relevant information set, this is no longer true. In general:
∆1(IE)=
Pr(Y1 =1 ,D=1 |IE)
Pr(Y0 =1 ,D=1 |IE)
6=
Pr(Y1 =1 ,D=1 |IE)
Pr(Y0 =1 ,D=0 |IE)
= b ∆1 (IE).
The biases can be substantial. Suppose that I00
E = {f2} and consider the following simulations. Assume
that the true model is
α11 = α01 = αV 1 =1
α12 = α02 =1
µ1 = µ0 = µV = −1
(ε1,ε 0,ε V ,f 1,f 2) ∼ N (0,Σ)
where Σ is the identity matrix. Values of αV 2 are speci￿ed in the examples presented below. Given these
assumptions, there is no eﬀect of treatment so ∆1 =1 .I n￿gures 7 and 8 we show what happens when the











Y0 =1 ,D=0 |I00
E
¢
26to measure the eﬀect of treatment. Figure 7 illustrates the case in which we assume that αV 2 =1
whereas ￿gure 8 shows the case of αV 2 = −1. In both cases matching does not estimate the true eﬀect of
treatment when the analyst uses information that does not contain the full minimal relevant information
set. Furthermore, the discrepancy between the estimate and the true eﬀect of treatment changes as we
change the level of f2 on which we are conditioning. Depending on the choice of f2, we get either positive
or negative estimated treatment eﬀects. This result is again analogous to the continuous case result stating
that matching estimates are biased when the analyst does not use the minimal relevant information set.






















or the log versions of both b ∆1 and b ∆2.
6.6 On the use of model selection criteria to choose matching variables
We have just shown that adding more variables from the minimal relevant information set, but not all
variables in it, may increase bias. There are no rigorously justi￿ed algorithms for identifying a relevant
information set. Adding variables that are statistically signi￿cant in the treatment choice equation is not
guaranteed to select a set of conditioning variables that satis￿es condition (M-1). This is demonstrated
by the analysis of section (6.3) that shows that adding f2 when it determines D may increase bias. The
existing literature (e.g., Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997) proposes other criteria based on selecting the
set of variables that maximizes some goodness of ￿t criteria (λ) where a lower λ means a better ￿t. The
intuition behind such criteria is that by using some measure of goodness of ￿t as a guiding principle one is
using information relevant to the decision process. It is clear that knowing f2 improves goodness of ￿ts o
that in general such a rule is de￿cient if f1 is not known.
An implicit assumption underlying such procedures is that the added conditioning variables C are
exogenous in the following sense
(Y0,Y 1) ⊥ ⊥ D|IE,C (M-4)
27where IE is interpreted as the variables initially used as conditioning variables before C is added. Failure
of exogeneity is a failure of (M-1), and matching estimators are biased.
In the literature, the use of such rules of thumb is justi￿ed in two diﬀerent ways. Sometimes it is claimed
that they provide a relative guide. Sets of variables with lower λ (better goodness of ￿t) are alleged to be
better than sets of variables with higher λ in the sense that they generate lower biases. However, we have
already shown that this is not true. We know that enlarging the analyst￿s information from IE = {Z} to
I0
E = {Z,f2} will improve ￿ts i n c ef2 is also in IA. But, going from IE to I0
E might increase the bias. So, it
is not true that combinations of variables that decrease some measure of discrepancy λ necessarily reduce
the bias. Table 4 illustrates this point using a normal example. Going from row 1 to row 2, adding f2
improves goodness of ￿t and increases bias for all three treatment parameters, because (M-4) is violated.
A rule of thumb is sometimes invoked as an absolute standard against which to compare. The argument
is as follows. The analyst asserts that there is a combination of variables I00 that satisfy (M-1) and hence
produces zero bias and a value of λ = λ00 smaller than that of any other I. Now we know that conditioning
on {Z,f1,f 2} generates zero bias. However, we can exclude Z and still get zero bias. Since Z is a
determinant of D this shows immediately that the best ￿tting model does not necessarily identify the
minimal relevant information set. In this example including Z is innocuous because there is still zero bias
and the add conditioning variables satis￿es (M-4). In general, such a rule is not innocuous. If goodness of
￿t is used as a rule to choose variables on which to match, there is no guarantee it produces a desirable
conditioning set. If we include in the conditioning set variables C that violate (M-4), they may improve
the ￿t of predicted probabilities but worsen bias.
We can always construct a collection of conditioning variables e e IE with a better ￿ta n dalarger bias
than can be obtained from just conditioning on {f1,f 2}.L e t
e e IE = {Z,S}
where






η ⊥ ⊥ (f1,f 2,ε 0,ε 1,ε V ).
28The expressions for the biases are the same as in equations (3) - (5) using e e βj (j =0 ,1) instead of βj where:






































In general, these expressions are not zero so that using propensity score matching will generate a bias.
T h es o u r c eo ft h eb i a si st h em e a s u r e m e n te r r o ri nS for V. Now, to prove that this combination of variables
has a better ￿t all we need do is arbitrarily reduce σ2
η. In particular, when σ2
η =0we can perfectly predict






Pr(D =1 |V − Zγ + η,Z)=1 for V> 0
lim
ε→0
Pr(D =1 |V − Zγ + η,Z)=0 for V< 0.
However, when the limit is attained assumption (M-2) is violated and matching breaks down. Making σ2
η
arbitrarily small, we can predict D arbitrarily well so we can always decrease λ enough to get a combination
of variables with better ￿t for predicted probabilities and larger bias than a model that conditions only on
the minimal relevant information f1 and f2.
Table 4 illustrates this point by generating two such variables (S1,S 2) and showing that, by reducing σ2
η,
we are able to increase either of two goodness of ￿t criteria (the percentage of correct in sample predictions
of D and the pseudo R2) above those of the model with IE = IR. Adding a model based on S2 and Z
(bottom row) increases the successful prediction rate over the case when the true model is used (the model
based on {Z,f1,f 2}) but it is biased for all parameters and substantially biased for ATE and MTE.
The essential feature of this example is that the selected conditioning variables are endogenous with
respect to the outcome equation (they violate (M-4)). If all candidate conditioning variables were restricted
to be exogenous, our example could not be constructed. This underscores the importance of the econometric
concept of endogeneity which is sometimes viewed as an inessential distinction in matching. Although it
is irrelevant for de￿ning parameters, it is essential when selecting conditioning variables.
297C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
This paper considers three main points regarding the use of the propensity score in econometric evaluation
methods. The ￿rst point is that the economic and statistical assumptions required to justify the use of the
propensity score are diﬀerent in selection, matching and instrumental variables models. In general, one set
of assumptions neither implies nor is implied by the other. In the case of additive separability of outcome
equations, matching models are a special case of selection models that assumes that conditioning eliminates
bias whereas control function methods model selection bias. Matching makes strong assumptions that are
not required in the method of control functions. It assumes that conditional on observables the marginal
return is the average return. One bene￿t of such strong assumptions is weaker assumptions about other
features of the underlying economic model. Matching does not require separability of outcomes, exogeneity
of regressors or exclusion restrictions provided valid conditioning sets are known.
The second main point is that the literature on matching provides no guidance on the choice of the
conditioning variables that generate identi￿cation. We de￿ne the concept of the ￿minimum relevant￿
conditioning set that is assumed in matching. In general, it diﬀers from the information set available to
the analyst. Adding more ￿minimum relevant￿ variables but not all is not guaranteed to reduce bias and
we oﬀer examples of this point.
Our third main point is that the model selection criteria advocated to pick the variables in the condi-
tioning set are not guaranteed to work. We oﬀer examples where goodness of ￿t criteria advocated in the
literature select conditioning sets that generate more bias than conditioning sets that are less successful in
terms of model selection criterion. The methods work for choice among exogenous conditioning variables.
This highlights the point that the econometric distinctions of exogeneity and endogeneity play crucial roles
in the application of matching in the choice of conditioning sets.
The sensitivity of estimates obtained from matching to the choice of conditioning variables, the inability
of the method to model omitted relevant conditioning variables and the lack of any clear rule for selecting
conditioning variables should give pause to economists who embrace this method.24 More robust methods
based on the control function approach are more sensitive to problems of omitted conditioning variables.
Recent semiparametric advances in the development of control functions make these procedures less vul-
nerable to the distributional assumptions that plagued the earlier literature on the topic (see Powell, 1994,
and Heckman and Vytlacil, 2003).
30Appendix
Consider a general model of the form:
Y1 = µ1 + U1
Y0 = µ0 + U0
V = µV (Z)+UV
D =1 if V ≥ 0, =0otherwise
Y = DY1 +( 1− D)Y0.
where
(U1,U 0,U V )




i =0 ;j =1
cov (U1,V)=σ1V
cov (U0,V)=σ0V
Let φ(•) and Φ(•) be the pdf and the cdf of a standard normal random variable. Then, the propensity
score for this model is given by:










= Φ−1 (1 − p).
Since the event
‡
V S 0,P(µV (Z)) = p
·








S Φ−1 (1 − p)
we can write the conditional expectations required to get the biases de￿n e di nS e c t i o n( 4 )a saf u n c t i o no f
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¶
= β1M1(p)

























= Φ−1 (1 − p),P(µV (Z)) = p
¶





Similarly for U0 :
E (U0|V> 0,P(µV )=p)=β0M1(p)
E (U0|V< 0,P(µV )=p)=β0M0(p)
















Φ−1 (1 − p)
¢
(1 − p)
are inverse Mills ratio terms.
Substituting these into the expressions for the biases
Bias TT(p)=β0M1(p) − β0M0(p)
= β0M(p)
Bias ATE (p)=β1M1(p) − β0M0(p)
= M(p)(β1 (1 − p)+β0p)
32Bias MTE = β1M1(p) − β0M0(p) − β1Φ−1 (1 − p)+β0Φ−1 (1 − p)
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37Notes
1See, e.g., Olley and Pakes (1996) who confuse the use of the propensity score in matching and in
control function methods.
2Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997) introduced this distinction into matching models.
3Papers that account for estimated P include Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997, 1998), and Hahn
(1998).
4See Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997) and Abadie (2002).
5As demonstrated in Carneiro (2002), one can still distinguish marginal and average eﬀects in terms of
observables.
6The precise condition is that Support(X|Z)=Support(X).
7As noted by Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998), if one seeks to identify E (Y1 − Y0|D =1 ,W)
one only needs to impose a weaker condition (E (Y0|D =1 ,W)) = E (Y0|D =0 ,W) or Y0 ⊥ ⊥ D|W rather
than (M-1). This imposes the assumption of no selection on levels of Y0 (given W) and not the assumption
of no selection on levels of Y1 or change, as (M-1) does.
8Examples of nonseparable models are found in Cameron and Heckman (1998).
9Or mean independent in the case of mean parameters.
10Heckman and Robb (1985, 1986) introduce this general formulation of control functions. The identi￿a-
bility requires that the members of the pairs (µ1 (X),E(U1|X,Z,D =1 ) )and (µ0 (X),E(U0|X,Z,D =0 ) )
be ￿variation free￿ or ￿measurably separable￿ so that they can be independently varied against each other.
See Heckman and Vytlacil (2003) for a precise statement of these conditions.
11More precisely, Support(Z|X)=Support(Z). This is also the support condition used in the general-
ization of matching by Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997).




= E (U0|D =1 ,Z)P (Z)+E (U0|D =0 ,Z)(1− P (Z))
E (U0|D =1 ,Z)=−
(1 − P (Z))
P (Z)
E (U0|D =0 ,Z)=−
(1 − P (Z))
P (Z)
K0 (P (Z))
See Heckman and Robb (1986).
14For many common functional forms for the distributions of unobservables, no exclusion is required.
15Relaxing it, however, requires that the analyst model the dependence of the unobservables on the
observables and that certain variation-free conditions are satis￿ed (See Heckman and Robb, 1985).
3816See also Viverberg (1993) who does such a sensitivity analysis in a parametric model with an uniden-
ti￿ed parameter.
17Proof:
E (Y |X,P (Z)) = E (Y1|D =1 ,X,P(Z))P (Z)


















V = FV (UV ). Thus
∂E(Y |X,P (Z))
∂P (Z)
= E (Y1 − Y0|X,U∗
V = −P (Z))
= MTE.
18See also the discussion in Ger￿n and Lechner (2002).
19We start with a primitive probability space (Ω,σ,P) with associated random variables I. We use
minimal sigma algebras and assume the I are measurable with respect to these random variables.
20This formulation assumes that the agent makes the treatment decision. If not, then we mean by the
agent, the decision maker.
21Models that take this form are known as factor models and have been applied in the context of selection
by Aakvik, Heckman and Vytacil (2003), Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2001, 2003) Hansen, Heckman
and Mullen (2003) and Navarro-Lozano (2002) among others.
22For example, the returns to schooling literature often uses diﬀerent test scores, like AFQT or IQ, to
proxy for missing ability variables.
23See Aakvik, Heckman and Vytlacil (2003) for an analysis of discrete treatment eﬀects in a latent
variables model. See also Heckman (1998) where this framework originates.
24A widely cited paper by Dehejia and Wahba (1999) claims that matching overcomes the sensitivity to
estimators problem displayed by LaLonde (1986). Smith and Todd (2001, 2003) show that the Dehejia-
Wahba results were manufactured by selectively discarding data from LaLonde￿s original sample and that
when the full sample is used matching produces substantial biases. Matching does not solve the LaLonde
sensitivity problem.















Table 1ρ0V -1.00 -0.75 -0.50 -0.25 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
-1.00 -1.7920 -1.5680 -1.3440 -1.1200 -0.8960 -0.6720 -0.4480 -0.2240 0
-0.75 -1.5680 -1.3440 -1.1200 -0.8960 -0.6720 -0.4480 -0.2240 0 0.2240
-0.50 -1.3440 -1.1200 -0.8960 -0.6720 -0.4480 -0.2240 0 0.2240 0.4480
-0.25 -1.1200 -0.8960 -0.6720 -0.4480 -0.2240 0 0.2240 0.4480 0.6720
0 -0.8960 -0.6720 -0.4480 -0.2240 0 0.2240 0.4480 0.6720 0.8960
0.25 -0.6720 -0.4480 -0.2240 0 0.2240 0.4480 0.6720 0.8960 1.1200
0.50 -0.4480 -0.2240 0 0.2240 0.4480 0.6720 0.8960 1.1200 1.3440
0.75 -0.2240 0 0.2240 0.4480 0.6720 0.8960 1.1200 1.3440 1.5680
1.00 0 0.2240 0.4480 0.6720 0.8960 1.1200 1.3440 1.5680 1.7920
ρ0V -1.00 -0.75 -0.50 -0.25 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
-1.00 -2.6879 -2.2399 -1.7920 -1.3440 -0.8960 -0.4480 0 0.4480 0.8960
-0.75 -2.4639 -2.0159 -1.5680 -1.1200 -0.6720 -0.2240 0.2240 0.6720 1.1200
-0.50 -2.2399 -1.7920 -1.3440 -0.8960 -0.4480 0 0.4480 0.8960 1.3440
-0.25 -2.0159 -1.5680 -1.1200 -0.6720 -0.2240 0.2240 0.6720 1.1200 1.5680
0 -1.7920 -1.3440 -0.8960 -0.4480 0 0.4480 0.8960 1.3440 1.7920
0.25 -1.5680 -1.1200 -0.6720 -0.2240 0.2240 0.6720 1.1200 1.5680 2.0159
0.50 -1.3440 -0.8960 -0.4480 0 0.4480 0.8960 1.3440 1.7920 2.2399
0.75 -1.1200 -0.6720 -0.2240 0.2240 0.6720 1.1200 1.5680 2.0159 2.4639
1.00 -0.8960 -0.4480 0 0.4480 0.8960 1.3440 1.7920 2.2399 2.6879
*Equal to the Mean Bias for the Marginal Treatment Effect
BIASATE = ρ1V*σ1*M1(p) - ρ0V*σ0*M0(p)













Method Exclusion Required? Separability of Observables Functional Forms Marginal = Key Identi￿cation
and Unobservables Required? Average? Condition for Means
inOutcomeEquations?(GivenX,Z)AssumingSeparability (See text for full conditions)
Matching No No No Yes E (U1|X,D =1 ,Z)=E (U1|X,Z)
E (U0|X,D =0 ,Z)=E (U0|X,Z)
Control Function Yes (for Conventional, Conventional, No E (U0|X,D =0 ,Z) and
nonparametric but not required but not required E (U1|X,D =1 ,Z)
identi￿cation) can be varied independently of
µ0(X)andµ1(X),respectively
andinterceptscanbeidenti￿ed through limit arguments
IVYesYesNoNo(YesinE(U0 + D(U1 − U0)|X,Z)
(conventional) standard case) = E (U0 + D(U1 − U0)|X)( ATE)
E (U0 + D(U1 − U0) − E (U0 + D(U1 − U0)|X)|P (Z),X)
= E (U0 + D(U1 − U0) − E (U0 + D(U1 − U0)|X)|X)( TT)
LIV Yes No No No (U0,U1,UV)⊥⊥Z|X Correct in-sample prediction rate  Pseudo R
2 TT ATE MTE
Z 66.88% 0.1284 1.1380 1.6553 1.6553
Z, f2 75.02% 0.2791 1.2671 1.9007 1.9007
Z, f1, f2 83.45% 0.4844 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Z, S1  77.59%  0.3352  0.8603  1.2513  1.2513
Z, S2  92.45%  0.7555  0.3156  0.4591  0.4591
Variables in 
Probit
Goodness of fit statistics  Average Bias
Table 4
Model:￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
V= Z+f1+f2+ev￿ ￿ ev~N(0,1)￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Y1=2f1+0.1f2+e1￿ ￿ e1~N(0,1)￿ ￿ ￿
Y0=f1+0.1f2+e0￿￿ e0~N(0,1)￿ ￿ ￿
￿   ￿ ￿ f1~N(0,1)
￿ ￿ ￿ f2~N(0,1)￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
S1 = V + u1￿ u1~N(0,4)









Bias for Average Treatment Effect








Average Bias = 1.6553
Average Bias = 1.9007













Bias for Treatmenton the Treated








Average Bias = 1.2671
Average Bias = 1.1380



















Average Bias = 1.1616
Average Bias = 1.1380














Bias for Marginal Treatment Effect








Average Bias = 1.9007
Average Bias = 1.6553




















Average Bias = 1.7019 Average Bias = 1.6553




















Bias for AverageTreatment Effect
Average Bias = 1.6553 Average Bias = 1.7019





Model:￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
V= Z+f1+f2+ev￿ ev~N(0,1)￿ ￿ ￿
Y1=2f1+0.1f2+e1￿ e1~N(0,1)￿ ￿ ￿
Y0=f1+0.1f2+e0￿ e0~N(0,1)￿ ￿ ￿
￿   ￿ ￿ f1~N(0,1)























Estimated Effect ofTreatment under Different Information Sets
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Estimated Effect ofTreatment under Different Information Sets




































Estimated Effect ofTreatment under Different Information Sets



























Estimated Effect ofTreatment under Different Information Sets

























Estimated Effect ofTreatment under Different Information Sets
No Effect ofTreatment and αv2=-1
Pr(Y0=1,D=0|IE) ________________ ()
Pr(Y1=1,D=1|IE) ________________
__________________ Pr(Y1=0,D=1|IE)
Pr(Y0=0,D=0|IE)
IE={f1,f2}
IE={f2}
Model:
V= -1+f1-f2+εv εv~N(0,1)
Y*1=-1+f1+f2+ε1 ε1~N(0,1)
Y*0=-1+f1+f2+ε0 ε0~N(0,1)
Y1=1(Y*1>0) f1~N(0,1)
Y0=1(Y*0>0) f2~N(0,1)
D=1(V>0)
∆4=Log
<
^